[Edited] Assignment 2: Reader Response Final
In the article “Hotel New World Collapse”, Lim (2009) reported on the aftermath of the collapse of Hotel New World, including brief details on the causes that led to the structural failure.
Following the collapse, initial rescue attempts were hampered by the lack of rescue personnel and tools specialising in structural collapse. Lim stated that international tunnelling professionals and specialised equipment were brought in to assist with rescue efforts. Nearby establishments were re-purposed as command and support centres by the authorities. According to Lim, these efforts resulted in the rescue of 17 individuals. Lim highlighted that the Commission of Inquiry determined that “inadequate structural design”, unqualified draftsmen and a new roof installation caused the collapse. The Commission proposed that the government should be more proactive in the building industry to prevent future failures. Consequently, the Ministry of National Development was assigned to perform structural audits on subsequent constructions.
Alongside the measures mentioned by Lim, a new legislation called the Building Control Act 1989 was passed on 1st May 1989. Its two most pivotal aspects are the introduction of an “accredited checker”, an experienced professional tasked with ensuring the adequacy of a building’s design, and routine inspections of a building’s structural integrity after construction (Netto & Christudason, 2001, as cited in Neale, 2001). Since the implementation of the Building Control Act 1989 and commencement of the mandatory Periodic Structural Inspection (PSI), structural defects detected in buildings have been reduced from “one in every 50 buildings” in the 1990s to “one in every 200 buildings” in 2015 (Murthy, 2016).
However, despite the successes of the Building Control Act, that legislation is deficient in preventing the occurrence of worksite mishaps caused by structural failures.
One such deficiency is the Building Control Act inadequacy in establishing regulations on structural designs and construction site management for “major geotechnical works” (Rajah&Tann Asia, 2007). On 20 April 2004, a tunnelling-induced cave-in initiated the collapse of Nicoll Highway. The cave-in occurred during the excavation of the MRT tunnels, for the Circle Line, running under Nicoll Highway. In its final press release, the Committee of Inquiry(2005) determined that “critical design errors” of the tunnel’s wall bracing support system were the causes of the cave-in and subsequent collapse of Nicoll Highway. According to the Committee of Inquiry (2015), improper assumptions were made during the designing process regarding the soil conditions at the excavation site. This led to a flaw in the design of the supporting wall braces. Additionally, poor site management and monitoring resulted in “deviations in actual construction”, resulting in a support system that was “50% weaker” than safety requirements (Committee of Inquiry, 2015). The collapse of Nicoll Highway resulted in road closures which “affected thousands of commuters”, a power outage in “Marina Bay and Suntec City areas” and four deaths (Ahmad, 2004), all of which could have been easily avoided if the Building Control Act had sufficient regulations put in place for structural designs and construction site management for geotechnical works.
Additionally, the Building Control Act is deficient in enforcing the necessity of experienced design engineers or supervising design engineers for structural projects. It also fails to establish countermeasure against false certification of structural plans. On 14 July 2017, structural cracks in two load-bearing support structures, corbels, led to the “sudden brittle failure and collapse”(Yang, 2019, as cited in Tan, 2019) of the PIE viaduct. “Prosecution experts” attested that the failure was a direct result of overloading, which arose from errors in the corbel’s design(Tang, 2019a). According to Ng (2019), calculation errors in the design were due to an inexperienced design team. The situation was exacerbated by the accredited checker’s and lead design engineer’s failure to review the completed designs of the supporting and main viaduct structures. Furthermore, the lead design engineer submitted “false certification” claiming that the designs complied with the Building Control Act (Lam, 2019). The resulting corbel constructed based on the designs would have only been able to support “less than half of its intended load” (Yeung, 2019, as cited in Tan, 2019). Despite unapproved works done to strengthen the supporting structures (Tan, Yang, Ho, Ho, Ho & Yeo, 2019, as cited in Lam, 2019), it was insufficient in preventing the viaduct collapse, which resulted in one dead and ten injured workers (Tang, 2019b). This collapse means that the current Building Control Act is insufficient in ensuring that design engineers are experienced or supervised, and that structural plans are not falsely certified by engineers.
In order to counter the deficiencies in the Building Control Act, the government should play a more proactive role in ensuring that the Building Control Act is a preventive legislation and that regulations are put in place before the occurrence of worksite accidents caused by structural failures.
References
Ahmad, N. (2004, December 17). Nicoll Highway collapse. National Library Board. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_430_2004-12-17.html
Committee of Inquiry. (2015, May 13). Committee of inquiry concludes string of critical design errors caused collapse at Nicoll Highway [Press Release]. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/20050513987.pdf
Lam, L. (2019, November 20). PIE viaduct collapse: Engineer admits he knew about design errors, structural cracks before fatal accident. Channel News Asia. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/pie-viaduct-collapse-engineer-knew-design-errors-cracks-12110464
Lim, T. S. (2009, January 2). Hotel New World collapse. National Library Board. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_783__2009-01-02.html
Murthy, A. (2016, March 1). Insuring ASEAN’s building/construction Industry the S’pore way: The missing jigsaw of professional engineering certification. Building Review Journal. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from http://brj.com.sg/insuring-aseans-buildingconstruction-industry-the-spore-way-the-missing-jigsaw-of-professional-engineering-certification/
Netto, A. M. & Christudason, A. (2001). Who Pays?: Culpability of experts for building failures in Singapore. In B. S. Neale (Ed.), Forensic engineering: The investigation of failures: Proceedings of the second international conference on forensic engineering organized by the Institution of Civil Engineers and held in London, UK, on 12-13 November 2001 (pp. 128). Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=PjiniwA--rsC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false
Ng, C. (2019, July 30). PIE viaduct collapse: Or Kim Peow Contractors fined $10,000 for carrying out unauthorised works. The Straits Times. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/pie-viaduct-collapse-or-kim-peow-contractors-fined-10000-for-carrying-out
Rajah & Tann Asia. (2007, September). Building Control Act to be amended. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://eoasis.rajahtann.com/eOASIS/lu/pdf/07-Sep-Building-Control-Act.pdf
Tan, C. (2019, August 1). PIE viaduct collapse: Structural cracks were found one month before incident. The Straits Times. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/pie-viaduct-collapse-structural-cracks-were-found-one-month-before-incident
Tang, L. (2019, August 1). Structural cracks spotted 30 mins before fatal PIE viaduct collapse but work went on, court hears. Today Online. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/structural-cracks-spotted-30-mins-fatal-pie-collapse-work-went-court-hears
Tang, L. (2019, November 20). Fatal PIE viaduct collapse: Engineer admits to reckless act, not checking his team’s calculations. Today Online. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/fatal-pie-viaduct-collapse-engineer-admits-reckless-act-not-checking-his-teams
Alongside the measures mentioned by Lim, a new legislation called the Building Control Act 1989 was passed on 1st May 1989. Its two most pivotal aspects are the introduction of an “accredited checker”, an experienced professional tasked with ensuring the adequacy of a building’s design, and routine inspections of a building’s structural integrity after construction (Netto & Christudason, 2001, as cited in Neale, 2001). Since the implementation of the Building Control Act 1989 and commencement of the mandatory Periodic Structural Inspection (PSI), structural defects detected in buildings have been reduced from “one in every 50 buildings” in the 1990s to “one in every 200 buildings” in 2015 (Murthy, 2016).
However, despite the successes of the Building Control Act, that legislation is deficient in preventing the occurrence of worksite mishaps caused by structural failures.
One such deficiency is the Building Control Act inadequacy in establishing regulations on structural designs and construction site management for “major geotechnical works” (Rajah&Tann Asia, 2007). On 20 April 2004, a tunnelling-induced cave-in initiated the collapse of Nicoll Highway. The cave-in occurred during the excavation of the MRT tunnels, for the Circle Line, running under Nicoll Highway. In its final press release, the Committee of Inquiry(2005) determined that “critical design errors” of the tunnel’s wall bracing support system were the causes of the cave-in and subsequent collapse of Nicoll Highway. According to the Committee of Inquiry (2015), improper assumptions were made during the designing process regarding the soil conditions at the excavation site. This led to a flaw in the design of the supporting wall braces. Additionally, poor site management and monitoring resulted in “deviations in actual construction”, resulting in a support system that was “50% weaker” than safety requirements (Committee of Inquiry, 2015). The collapse of Nicoll Highway resulted in road closures which “affected thousands of commuters”, a power outage in “Marina Bay and Suntec City areas” and four deaths (Ahmad, 2004), all of which could have been easily avoided if the Building Control Act had sufficient regulations put in place for structural designs and construction site management for geotechnical works.
Additionally, the Building Control Act is deficient in enforcing the necessity of experienced design engineers or supervising design engineers for structural projects. It also fails to establish countermeasure against false certification of structural plans. On 14 July 2017, structural cracks in two load-bearing support structures, corbels, led to the “sudden brittle failure and collapse”(Yang, 2019, as cited in Tan, 2019) of the PIE viaduct. “Prosecution experts” attested that the failure was a direct result of overloading, which arose from errors in the corbel’s design(Tang, 2019a). According to Ng (2019), calculation errors in the design were due to an inexperienced design team. The situation was exacerbated by the accredited checker’s and lead design engineer’s failure to review the completed designs of the supporting and main viaduct structures. Furthermore, the lead design engineer submitted “false certification” claiming that the designs complied with the Building Control Act (Lam, 2019). The resulting corbel constructed based on the designs would have only been able to support “less than half of its intended load” (Yeung, 2019, as cited in Tan, 2019). Despite unapproved works done to strengthen the supporting structures (Tan, Yang, Ho, Ho, Ho & Yeo, 2019, as cited in Lam, 2019), it was insufficient in preventing the viaduct collapse, which resulted in one dead and ten injured workers (Tang, 2019b). This collapse means that the current Building Control Act is insufficient in ensuring that design engineers are experienced or supervised, and that structural plans are not falsely certified by engineers.
In order to counter the deficiencies in the Building Control Act, the government should play a more proactive role in ensuring that the Building Control Act is a preventive legislation and that regulations are put in place before the occurrence of worksite accidents caused by structural failures.
References
Ahmad, N. (2004, December 17). Nicoll Highway collapse. National Library Board. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_430_2004-12-17.html
Committee of Inquiry. (2015, May 13). Committee of inquiry concludes string of critical design errors caused collapse at Nicoll Highway [Press Release]. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/20050513987.pdf
Lam, L. (2019, November 20). PIE viaduct collapse: Engineer admits he knew about design errors, structural cracks before fatal accident. Channel News Asia. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/pie-viaduct-collapse-engineer-knew-design-errors-cracks-12110464
Lim, T. S. (2009, January 2). Hotel New World collapse. National Library Board. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_783__2009-01-02.html
Murthy, A. (2016, March 1). Insuring ASEAN’s building/construction Industry the S’pore way: The missing jigsaw of professional engineering certification. Building Review Journal. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from http://brj.com.sg/insuring-aseans-buildingconstruction-industry-the-spore-way-the-missing-jigsaw-of-professional-engineering-certification/
Netto, A. M. & Christudason, A. (2001). Who Pays?: Culpability of experts for building failures in Singapore. In B. S. Neale (Ed.), Forensic engineering: The investigation of failures: Proceedings of the second international conference on forensic engineering organized by the Institution of Civil Engineers and held in London, UK, on 12-13 November 2001 (pp. 128). Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=PjiniwA--rsC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false
Ng, C. (2019, July 30). PIE viaduct collapse: Or Kim Peow Contractors fined $10,000 for carrying out unauthorised works. The Straits Times. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/pie-viaduct-collapse-or-kim-peow-contractors-fined-10000-for-carrying-out
Rajah & Tann Asia. (2007, September). Building Control Act to be amended. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://eoasis.rajahtann.com/eOASIS/lu/pdf/07-Sep-Building-Control-Act.pdf
Tan, C. (2019, August 1). PIE viaduct collapse: Structural cracks were found one month before incident. The Straits Times. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/pie-viaduct-collapse-structural-cracks-were-found-one-month-before-incident
Tang, L. (2019, August 1). Structural cracks spotted 30 mins before fatal PIE viaduct collapse but work went on, court hears. Today Online. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/structural-cracks-spotted-30-mins-fatal-pie-collapse-work-went-court-hears
Tang, L. (2019, November 20). Fatal PIE viaduct collapse: Engineer admits to reckless act, not checking his team’s calculations. Today Online. Retrieved February 14, 2020, from https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/fatal-pie-viaduct-collapse-engineer-admits-reckless-act-not-checking-his-teams
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