Assignment 2: Reader Response Draft 1
In the article “Hotel New World Collapse”, Lim (2009) reported on the aftermath of the collapse of Hotel New World, including brief details on the causes that led to the structural failure.
Following the collapse, initial rescue attempts were hampered by the lack of rescue personnel and tools, specialising in structural collapse. Lim stated that international tunnelling professionals and specialised equipment were brought in to assist with rescue efforts. Nearby establishments were re-purposed as command and support centres by the authorities. According to Lim, these efforts resulted in the rescue of 17 individuals.
Lim highlighted that the Commission of Inquiry determined that “inadequate structural design”, unqualified draftsmen and a new roof installation caused the collapse. They proposed that the government should be more proactive in the building industry to prevent future failures. Consequently, the Ministry of National Development was assigned to perform structural audits on subsequent constructions.
Alongside the measures mentioned in the article, a new legislation called the Building Control Act 1989 was passed on 1st May. Its two most pivotal aspects are the introduction of an “accredited checker”, an experienced professional tasked with ensuring the adequacy of a building’s design, and routine inspections of a building’s structural integrity after construction (Building Control Act, 2000, as cited in Neale, 2001).
Since the implementation of the Building Control Act 1989 and commencement of the mandatory Periodic Structural Inspection (PSI), structural defects detected in buildings have been reduced from “one in every 50 buildings” in the 1990s to “one in every 200 buildings” in 2015 (Murthy, 2016). However, despite the successes of the Building Control Act, that legislation fails to prevent the occurrence of worksite mishaps caused by structural failures.
The Building Control Act fails to provide sufficient regulation on the designing and construction monitoring of “major geotechnical works”(Rajah&Tann Asia, 2007).
On 20 April 2004, a tunnelling-induced cave-in initiated the collapse of Nicoll Highway. The cave-in occurred during the excavation of the MRT tunnels, for the Circle Line, running under Nicoll Highway. In its final press release, the Committee of Inquiry(2005) determined that “critical design errors” of the tunnel’s wall bracing support system were the causes of the cave-in and subsequent collapse of Nicoll Highway.
According to the Committee of Inquiry (2015), improper assumptions were made during the designing process, regarding the soil conditions at the excavation site. This led to a flaw in the design of the supporting wall braces. Additionally, poor site management and monitoring resulted in “deviations in actual construction”, resulting in a support system that is “50% weaker” than safety requirements (Committee of Inquiry, 2015).
The collapse of Nicoll Highway resulted in road closures which “affected thousands of commuters”, a power outage in “Marina Bay and Suntec City areas” and four deaths (Ahmad, 2004), all of which could have been easily avoided if the Building Control Act had sufficiently regulated the designing and construction monitoring of geotechnical works.
Following the collapse, initial rescue attempts were hampered by the lack of rescue personnel and tools, specialising in structural collapse. Lim stated that international tunnelling professionals and specialised equipment were brought in to assist with rescue efforts. Nearby establishments were re-purposed as command and support centres by the authorities. According to Lim, these efforts resulted in the rescue of 17 individuals.
Lim highlighted that the Commission of Inquiry determined that “inadequate structural design”, unqualified draftsmen and a new roof installation caused the collapse. They proposed that the government should be more proactive in the building industry to prevent future failures. Consequently, the Ministry of National Development was assigned to perform structural audits on subsequent constructions.
Alongside the measures mentioned in the article, a new legislation called the Building Control Act 1989 was passed on 1st May. Its two most pivotal aspects are the introduction of an “accredited checker”, an experienced professional tasked with ensuring the adequacy of a building’s design, and routine inspections of a building’s structural integrity after construction (Building Control Act, 2000, as cited in Neale, 2001).
Since the implementation of the Building Control Act 1989 and commencement of the mandatory Periodic Structural Inspection (PSI), structural defects detected in buildings have been reduced from “one in every 50 buildings” in the 1990s to “one in every 200 buildings” in 2015 (Murthy, 2016). However, despite the successes of the Building Control Act, that legislation fails to prevent the occurrence of worksite mishaps caused by structural failures.
The Building Control Act fails to provide sufficient regulation on the designing and construction monitoring of “major geotechnical works”(Rajah&Tann Asia, 2007).
On 20 April 2004, a tunnelling-induced cave-in initiated the collapse of Nicoll Highway. The cave-in occurred during the excavation of the MRT tunnels, for the Circle Line, running under Nicoll Highway. In its final press release, the Committee of Inquiry(2005) determined that “critical design errors” of the tunnel’s wall bracing support system were the causes of the cave-in and subsequent collapse of Nicoll Highway.
According to the Committee of Inquiry (2015), improper assumptions were made during the designing process, regarding the soil conditions at the excavation site. This led to a flaw in the design of the supporting wall braces. Additionally, poor site management and monitoring resulted in “deviations in actual construction”, resulting in a support system that is “50% weaker” than safety requirements (Committee of Inquiry, 2015).
The collapse of Nicoll Highway resulted in road closures which “affected thousands of commuters”, a power outage in “Marina Bay and Suntec City areas” and four deaths (Ahmad, 2004), all of which could have been easily avoided if the Building Control Act had sufficiently regulated the designing and construction monitoring of geotechnical works.
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